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AESTHETIC ALIENATION 
AND THE ART OF MODERNITY 
Rory J. Conces 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
The world pictured by Uie modem artist is. like the world mediated upon 
by the existential philosopher, a world where man is a strnnger. 
- William Barret~ Irrational Man: A Study in 
Existential Philosophy (1958) 
He [Hegel) did not have the feeling of being plunged into a challenging 
,world of alienation in his time, as we do today when confronted by the 
production or abs1tact and nonobjective an. 
-Hans-Georg Gadamer, ''111c Relevance of the 
Beautiful" (1986) 
Introduction 
Not long ago the walls of the world's great an museums were covered with 
realist poruaiture. landscapes. and sacred scenes. Thai was pre1ty much 1he 
exrent of canvas art. During the las1 hundred years. however. the scope of 
museum collections has become much more diverse. One can still find a 
lifelike portrail by Rubens, an idyllic landscape by Constable, or a sublime 
Christ scene by Raphael. Indeed, U1ere even seems to be a bias towards 
realist an, what the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty called 
the "objectivist" prejudice.' It is as though we expect art to function as a 
<lescription of the world in which we live. But museums have also become 
showcases for mo<lern painting, that is, so-called abstract painting. Works 
of this son seem to be disengaged from the recognizable featwes of our 
everyday world. from the same features that enable us 10 feel that we belong 
to !his worl<l, and thus seem 10 res isl our objccti vist prejudlce. 2 In ilS extreme 
fom1, thlsdetachmem from thesurrounding world appears to be nothing less 
than an obliteration of the familiar. a <lisruption in the man-world relation-
ship. References to familiar things are no longer evident. With no clue as 
to what is represented, such painting exhibits an "inli<lelityto the familiar. "3 
But if abstract painting renounces the world of physical appearance as itS 
starting point. our feeling of being at home in that world may give way to the 
feeling of alienation that is alluded to by Barrett and Gadamer. 
A sense of esrrangement was sure! y felt by much of the viewing public 
when these paintings made ll1cir debut on u,e art scene. Their siruggle to 
orient each painting int wo-dimensional space, so as to find some recogniz-
able object and keep their objcctivist perspective, was nolh.ing less than an 
encounter with somelh.ing alien. But what about all the generations of 
viewers that have followed them? Are we less likely 10 experience aesthcUc 
alienation? In this paper. I propose 10 show that aesthetic alienation is less 
likely 10 be experienced by present-day "objectivist" viewers of abstract art 
as long as their cognitive funds are gradually enriched by the scientific and 
technological advances of the 1wentlcth cemury. 'This is because such 
enriched funds. by providing a particular mode of access to the world. allow 
today's spectators 10 recognize and identify much more of the pictorial 
content of paintings that those viewers who first confronted thc works of 
abstract pai ntcrs. 
Pan One: Abstrac1 Painting 
Let us begin by considering the son of art that is commonly associalcd 
with acsll1elic alienation. namely. abstract painting. In spite Of the fact U1at 
the Romanticism of John Constable's East Anglia landscapes is easily 
distinguished from the Ahstrac1 Expressionism of Clyfford Still's asym-
metrical planar formations. it is imponam to no1e that art.ists and art 
historians have found themselves in a quandary over the nature of abstract 
art. The art historian Marcel Brion remind< us nf this ctifficnlly In the 
following passage: 
Few icnns in lhe vocabulary or Ilic history or art lend llicmsclves so 
much to confusion and cquivoca1ion as the word ''abs1tact." Tbis is 
beeause no vahtl tleliniuon of II actually exisL~ and.even more so. because 
!here is no agrccmcm abou1 lhe nature of lhe works 10 which one can apply 
lhc tcnn.• 
Yet much oflhls discussion comains ccnain adjectives designating the 
world of abstract an.terms like ' non-objective' and 'non-representational' .5 
Perhaps the best way to understand how these terms apply to abstract 
painting is 10 compare their application with the use of the terms 'objective' 
and 'rcp,-esentational' in describing rcaliSl painting. that is. painting that 
approaches "observation and ponrayal of the day-to-day essence of thlngs 
and beings, while adding to U1is objective truU1 as much as it can contain of 
the subjective feelings of Uie anist.''6 
Let us take. for cxa.mptl:. Ute work of Winslow Homer ( 1836-1910), 
perhaps the most effec1jve and well-known spokesman for American 
Realism. Homer's Breezing Up (1876) is a fine example of such art. He 
brings 10 life a scene in which three boys are out sailing with a Fishennan. 
It is ohjective aml representMi0031 insofar as it is a ponrayal of several 
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objects in recognizable form; U1e likeness between Homer's painted images 
and lhe physical objects is strong. Of course. there is much more to this 
painting than a set ofimages that rcscmbleobjects in the world. Homer gives 
us. among other things. a vivid perception of New England life as well as an 
expression of his warm Jove for nature. Dy focusing on recognition of 
features resembling lh.ings in the world, which is at the heart of realist (or 
naturalist) rcpresematJon (in contrast to symbolic [or conventional) repre-
sen1ation), we have underlined U1c imponancc of representation as It rel ates 
to the meaning of this work of an.' 
If we construe meaning or the function of a sign to be referential, then 
meaning involves three terms: first, an objec1 that functions as a sign or 
vehicle of meaning; second. another objcc1 U1a1 is meant by the sign; and 
lh.ird. an in1crpreter for whom the two objects are united by the relation of 
meaning.• In realist painting. then, wehaveanobject inthefonnof a colored 
shape on Uie canvas. the sign, and another object, the referent of the sign, 
which is a Uling in the world. In Uic case of Breezing Up. the representations 
(or signs) tha1 Homer gives us are qujte falUiful to that which they signify. 
The waves, for instance, look like the waves that can be seen on the surface 
of any large body of water. But surely not so faithful that the painted waves 
that appear to splash against his sailboat arc present-at-hand rather than 
represented. for they would never wet a vlc.,.'Cf's outStrctcllec! nand. "No 
painting," ii is said, "is ns concrete as an objec1 in na1urc •... "9 Toe point 
here is not that Homer's waves fall to achieve lhiee-cli mcnsionality. Rather 
it is the point that the images or designs on the canvas (the signilicrs), like 
the waves in Breezi11g Up, resemble physical objec,ts in the world (the 
signified). 
But not all paint.ings have representations as realistic as those of 
Homer's, which is to suggest that realism Is a matter of degree. 1lle 
acsthetician Monroe C. Beardsley makes this point in his Aesthetics when 
he writes that "representational design ... [is) more or less abstract . ... 
• Abstract' Is the converse of ·realistic,' in one ofits senses: 10 say that A is 
a more abstract representation than D is the same as to say that O is more 
realistic Uinn A."10 Take, forexamplt:, Edvard Munch's The Scream (1893) 
and GeorgesOraque'sHousesa11dTrees(l 908). Munch'seffons are to turn 
away from the details of the publicly recognizable world to one that Is 
dist.oned, bizarre, and fantastic. Similarly, we find Oraque's geometrical 
slmplifical.ions to illustrate a belaboring of Uie familiar. Yet we continue to 
recognize many of the objects that serve as signs; for example, a screaming 
person and a landscape of trees and buildings respectively. In other words. 
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thedeslgns in both paintings have enough in common with the objects in the 
world to represent them. Tus is even true. though to alesscrextent,ofworks 
by Wassily l<Jlndinsky. At first gl:ince. his lmproeisation No. JO (1913) 
appears 10 be nothing more than "chaos" on canvas, but which, upon 
prolonged examination. provides us with a few Images tMt resemble, 
among other things. two canon. . 
Toe "infidelity to the familiar." however, can become so excessive that 
there seems 10 be nothing less than an obliteration of all worldly form. The 
psychologist or an Rudolf Arnheim echoes and reinforces this point when 
he writes: 
Art bas become incomprehensible. Perh3ps nothing so much as this fact 
distinguishes an today f mm what it has 00:11 at any olller place oc time. Art 
baS always been used. and thought of.as a meansofinu:rpreling tbe nature 
of world ,u,d life to humnn eyes nnd ears; bul now lhc objects of art arc 
awarenlly :unong the most puzzling implements mru,hasevcr made. Now 
it is they th3t need inu:rpretation." 
This is also acknowledged by Orion. who suggests that this infidelity is 
common in works of abstract an, since they do not seek out their forms 
among those already existent in the world. There is. so to speak, a radical 
upheaval in the artist's relationship with nature, resulting in what appears to 
be artistic creation ex niltilo (owing nothing to objective or external 
reality)." Taken 10 its extreme. only rorms like geomculcal figures would 
be used which means that theanist considers only "two-dimensional space. 
a plane ~urfacc, and rejecting any spatial illusionism or even any allusion at 
all to a third dimension:·u 
Tus apparent obliteration is found in the work of Abstract Expression-
ists like those of the New York School in the late forties and nrucs (Jackson 
Pollock. Mark Rothko. Mark Tobey. among others). The school was an 
attempt 10 liberate an from the need to present an object; a shift away from 
"tilings" and an emphasis on the "incorp0rcal field."14 WheU1cr we look at 
Pollock's B111e Poles (1963). RoU1ko's Red. \Vltite, and Brow11 ( 1903), or 
Tobey's Harvest ( 1958). what we find is nothing like the realist paintings 
that incorporate the familiar objects of the world. As James K. Feibleman 
notes. it is small wonder mat some nave defined non-objective painting as 
"bare of representative meaning and stripped to the minimum of contenl."15 
P:11'1 Two: Aesthetic Alienation 
1llisstecrini;away from reilist painting may not come withOutexacling 
a very high price. however. Whereas we feel a certain familiarity with what 
is depicted in rcnlist painting. we often find non-representational paintingtO 
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be alien. Thus it shOuld come as no surprise ti1at philosophers like Barrett 
and G:idamer find aesllletic alienation to be a concomiunt of our viewing 
modern or abstract arL 
Eighteen years after the appearance of Trwlt and Method. Gadamer 
published The Re/evtu1ce of the Benwif11/ and Other Essays. Gadamcr finds 
the alienation that arises from abstract an to be nothing less than a separation 
from the aesthetic aspect of the cultural life of society. It is defined In terms 
of an "enormous gap between the traditional form and content of Western 
art and the ideals of contemporary :irtJsts."" Form and content are both 
crucial in this regard. 1l1e strict adherence to traditional form, which 
Included an uncompromising respect for linear perspective, solidity, and 
three-dimensionality. has been made incidental. if not altogether repudiated 
by modern non-representational artists beginning with the Cubist movc-
mentin U1cearly 1900s. lllis response, according to G3damer. was the start 
or a profound transformation in an. for it "led to the total elimination or any 
reference to an external object of the process of anistic creation."•' In 
addition, there was the break with traditional content, which construed man 
as a rational animal living in a familiar and intelligible world. According t0 
Barrett, then, this break with tradition means that 
everything is ques1ionabtc, 1iroblernmlc ... . Hence the themes that obsess 
ho1h modem art :>nd exiswntial philosorhy are the alicna1i .. , and suange-
ness of man in his world; the contradic1orincss. feebleness. and contin-
gency of human existence: the central and overwhelming reality of time 
for man who has lost his anchorage in the eternal." 
Although this wholesale divorce from tradition may be overstated, Gadamcr 
is nevertheless convinced of its importance: 
It rcmnlns an open question whether (l( not Uiis denial of our realistic 
expectations is ever really total. But one thing is quiteccnain: the naive 
assumpt.ion that lhe picture is a view- like that which we bnvedaily in our 
experience or nnture or of nature shaped by man-h:u clearly been 
fundamentally destroyed. We can no longer see a Cubist picture oc a 
nonobjective p:1in1ing at a glance. with a merely passive gaze. We must 
make an active conuibu1ion or our own and maxe an elTon 10 synthesize 
the outlines of the various ptnncsas Uiey appear on tile canvas. Only then, 
perhaps. can we be seired and uplifu:d by the profound harmony and 
rightncs.~ or a work, in the smne way a.~ readily happened in carHcr times 
on the basis of a pictorial content co1runon to all." 
The most cursory reading of Gadamer's works. then, suggcslS that 
contemporary abstract and non-objective an is unfamiliar to us. and it is this 
unfamiliarity that ls part and parcel of Its alienating naturc.w In U1e main, 
aesthetic alienation is an inability to relate toat least some works of an which 
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eventually leads 10 a feeling of separa1ion. of esuangemem, of disunity on 
the part of Uic viewer. In short. U1c viewer Jacks the proper rela1edness to 
these works and is separated from at least a portion of the cultural life of a 
society.it Regardless of the extent and intensi1y of this estrangemen1, Its 
basis Is always the same: a confrontation willl the unfarniUar. The person 
gazing at U1c painting docs not recognlzellle plc1orial contents as portraying 
things in lllc world. TI1ecotorcd shapes on the canvas do not represent Utlngs 
for that person. It therefore lacks the son of referential mearung that is 
associated with representational 3!1. There is an object which is thought to 
function as a sign as well as an interpreter of this object. But there appears 
to be no object thal is meant by the "sign," that is. a referent in the world. We 
have Jost the amalgam of sign and referent 
Of course. some migh1 argue that this definition of aesthetic alienation 
is 100 limiled insofar as it only covers one son of alienation. that is. the 
alienation that stems from an absence of any sort ofidcntification of the kind 
of object we are dealing with, whether it be a sailboat. a fisherman, or blue 
sky. What it does nol include. they might argue (and rightly so). is aesthetic 
alienation wW1 reganl 10 how somcU1lng is portrayed. A feminist aestheUclan, 
for example. might argue vehcmenlly Uiat she experiences a feeling of 
separation. of es1tangcmen1. of disunity whcnc,-cr she views one of the 
earliest trc3llllcnts of the femala nude in the Renaissance, that is, Sandro 
Ooticelli 's The Birth oJVe1111s (aflcr 1482). In shOn , she is unable to rela1e 
to this work of 3!1. ancl is therefore alienated from il Moreover, a similar 
response might be given by some men who view certain paintings. Indeed. 
some men may be no more able to rd ate to the bru1ali1y depicted in Nicolas 
Poussin's The Rape a/the S11bi11e Wome11 (before 1637)or the arrowriclclled 
body of a saint in Andrea Mantegnas's St Sebc,stim1 (about 1455-60) than 
women arc able to relate to the naked women in Ono Dix's Three Women 
(1926) or the partially clothed females in Pablo Picasso's Th•o Women 
R111111i11g 011 a Beach ( 1922). To rnlk about "kinds" of aesU1ctic aliena1ion. 
however. ls not so much a challenge 10 thedcflniUon of aesU1euc alienation 
that is used in this paper. especially since the paper's focus is abstract art, as 
it is a reminder that we can experience alienation even while we view the 
paintings of artists like Cons1ablc and Homer, albeil a less fundamental sort 
of alienation given that one mus1 he able 10 identify an object before one can 
be alienated from it in terms of how the object is portrayed. 
The key to apprecia1ing this lapse in recognition. regardless oflhc kind 
of alienation, may be found in whal Gadamcr and others have said about 
perception. panicul:trly aes1hetic perception. Perception ls not something 
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Ulat lacks "cognitive strands," as Gadamcr con1ends in the following 
passage: 
Perception is never a simple reflection of what is presented to the senses. 
... [P]erception conceived as :m adequate response 10 a stimulus would 
never be a mere mirroring or what is there. For it would always remain M 
understanding or somctlting as something .... Pure seeing and pure hearing 
arc dogmruic abstractions which attilicially reduce pllenomena. Percep-
tion always includes mcaning.n 
In an ex1temcly perceptive work dealing with this passage, Joel C. 
Wcinsheimer notes that Gad:uncr clearly shows us 
tb:11 perception, even aesthetic percep1ion. is n0t naiumlly or originally 
pure. It is "impure" in being always meaningful: we do not bear pure 
sounds but always a car in the street, a boby crying; we do nOI see pun: 
colors and shapes but always a face, a knife, a wrcatlt ur smoke." 
But allllough Weinsheimer argues for U1e meaningfulness of perception, he 
does believe thal a peison can "look at something in such a way that It is 'just 
there,' so that we see just what is there. "14 The point here is not just that pure 
seeing is a distinct possibility. Rather it is U1c more important poinl tha1 lhis 
son of seeing is not primary bul secondary. It is a derived seeing !hat Is far 
removed from our uuerances about this or that thing that reflect the richness 
or our language. 
Gaaamer is not alone in imbuing aesthetic perception with meaning. 
'The cognitive na1urc of aesU1ellc perception is perhaps best presented in E. 
H. Gombrich's most influential work.Art and lllusio11. Theroleof"mind 
sets" and "schemas." items which arc akin 10 what I refer 10 as "cognitive 
funds," is indicated in his reference to U1c "myth of the innocent eye": 
Whenever we receive a visual impression. we react by docketing i~ filing 
i~ grouping it in one way or another, even if the impression is only that of 
an inkb!Ot or a fingerprint. Roger Fry and the impressionists talked or the 
difficultyoffindingout what things lookcd likc 10 an unbiased eye because 
of what they called the "co,1ocp1ual habits" necessary 10 life. But if these 
habits arc necessary co life, the postulacc of an unbiased eye llemands the 
impossible .... The innocent eye is a myth." 
Seeing is. inshon. never just a 1113Uer of registering unconceptualizcd sense-
data. According 10 Gombrich, then, there is no separalion between Impres-
sions and cogniti vc constructions.26 The perception of art entails a person's 
cognitive fund, 3nd it is this fund, acquired over many years, that allows a 
person to see whal others. who have acquired a sintllar fund, see. To be sure, 
many of us have similar cognitive funds that allow us to see U1e same 
building, dog. or automobile. And this applies to paintings as well. If the 
distinctive characteristics or a sailboat are part of a person's cognitive 
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repertoire. Iha! person is likely lo recognize and identify some of the painled 
objecls as sailboals when he or she looks al Homer's Breezing Up. 
lnlerestingly enough, il is this notion of cognitive fund that Unks 
alienalion to abs1rac1 an. Some persons feel alienaled when they look at 
abstracl painlings, either having no idea whal 10 say or making comments 
such as "l don't undersland art these days," because they find certain works 
of art 10 be unfamiliar or unrelaled to the world U1ey live in, and U1ese works 
are unfamiliar or unrelaled because !hey do nol reOecl the individual's 
cognitive fund. Bul must the presem-day viewer of abstract an have such 
an experience? I believe this need nol be the case. In facl, I believe today's 
audience is less likely 10 be alienalcd by such an. 
Part Three: Acslhetic Alienation and Cognilive Funds 
ll mighl be argued lhal U1e experience of aesthetic alienation increases 
in scope and imensiiy as a person becomes more educated If so. alienation 
is direcll y prop0rtional 10 the growth of one's cognitive fund. "If alienation 
is more widespread now then it used 10 be." says Waller Kaufmann, "it is 
because more people receive more education today than formerly.''27 This 
is qulle plausible given the earlier discussion of the kind of aesthetic 
alienalion that sicms from how something is portrayed 10 the objeclivist 
viewer. It might be said oflhc fcmalcacsthctician, whose cognitive fund has 
undergone a change such that she now declares herself lo be a "feminist 
aeslhetician." lhat her sludy or gender relations has left her unable 10 relate 
to Boticelli · s depiction of women. thereby explaining her alienation from 
his The Birth of Venus. The converse may also be true, however. A person 
may be less apl 10 experience aesll1etic alienation as lhe scientific and 
lechnological achievemenls of lhe age are added to his or her cognitive 
stock. 'This is because the sons of images lhal seemed to be unfamiliar or 
unrelaled to lhe world are gradually identified as being a part of our world. 
This is not lo say that no one undergoes U1e experience of alienation when 
viewing abslracl an. Dul whal was though! 10 be abstract and non-
represenlational fifty years ago may not be construed as such today. As an 
acute observer of our age has put il: 
By the late twentiethcen1ury. in ways nevcrbcforcconceivable, images of 
the incomprehensibly small and the unimaginably large became part of 
everyone's experience. The cuhure saw photographs of galaxies and of 
atoms. No one has lO imagine, witll Leibniz, what the universe might be 
like on microscopic or telescopic scales-microscopes an<l telescopes 
made those images part of everyday experience." 
Such images, then, give us a point of reference for some of what we find in 
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abstracl painting. This leads Fcibleman 10 claim thal non-objecti vc art does 
represent, and lherefore it is entirely inaccuralC lo conceive of it as non-
representational. The represenlalions cllffer from those found in the works 
of nineteenlh-cenlury Realisls like Homer insofar as lhey are representa-
tions of abstractions lhal parallel ll1e abstractions of lhe world of science. 29 
Whal are thought of as non-objective works of an are not non-objective at 
all, but ac1ua11y works of art Iha! represent lhe Jess familiar world of science. 
~ this can take place without the arlisl 'S inlention of doing anything of the 
lcind. As Fe1bleman puts it, when he remarks on the work or various 
members of lhe New York School: 
Pollock's pruntings endeavor to attain to a kind of qualitative chaos, asllllC 
of perfecl disorder. They could as well have re)Tescn1ed a photomicro-
grnph Of Cal cortex, or tile paths of the molecules in a heated gas enclosed 
w1tll1~ a rec1.1ngular vessel. Witll a linlc patienl searching among photo-
graphtc plates of d,s1.1nt galaxies, one might find thal the paintings of de 
Koonmg and of Tobey are reprcscnuuional after all.'° 
We can clarify !his broadening of the scope of representational painting 
lo include some. if nol all, works thought 10 be abstracl, by citing specific 
examples in which isomorphisms can be discerned between images from 
artisls and images from scientisls. The works oflwo American artists, the 
Abstracl Expressionisl Barnell Newman and the Constructionist Charles 
Biederman clearly suppOrt this expansion. Newman's Vir Heroicus Sublimis 
(1950, 1951) is an extremely large canvas (eight by eighteen feet), the 
background of which is a single homogeneous color, a monochromatic field 
of cadmium red. divided by "zips" or exceedingly thin strips of the same 
color orconlrasling color U1at splil the huge red expanse vertically. At first 
glance, it may nol offer lhe viewer wiUt a familiar Image, with a configura-
tion of paint arranged on U1e canvas lhal resembles and, thus, represents 
something in the world. But ll1e siluation is much diffcrcnl for the viewer 
who is well-acquainted with aiomic absorption spectroscopy. Vir Heroicus 
Sublimis resembles !hat ponion of 1hedark-linespec1rumof sunlighl that has 
a wavelcng{li of approximately 700 nm (the red band of lhe spectrum). Toe 
only difference is U1a1 Newman's painting has vertical slrips of red. while. 
and yellow-brown, whereas lhe dark-line spectrogram of sunlight has dark 
"Fraunhofer" lines. Co11s1ruc1io11 (1940), by Biederman, is a much smaller 
work made of painted wood and metal rods lhal crisscross one anolher. 
Again, looking at Ulis work may nol remind lhe viewer of anything in the 
world. Having some knowledgeofX,raycllffraction. however, will provide 
the viewer willia cogniiive fund U1at will al leas! make il p0ssible lhal he or 
she will see a struciural configuralion in this work of art U1a1 is similar to the 
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divergent beam X-ray diffraction patterns from single crystals of Chemical 
substances. Isomorpltisms such as these. then, suggest that in at least some 
cases. what was once ll1ough1 10 be an escape from nature turns out to be 
nollting of the kind. TI1ey are more or less a means of glimpsing and 
comprehending Ille world Illar we live in. 
To make Ille inference that a few isomorphisms demonstrate that 
abstract art in general is representational , of course. is anolller matter: 
Picking out a couple of works that are isomorphic is not sufficient to make 
such a general ization. Pan of the problem. however. is that to become aware 
of these isomorphisms requires the appropriate cognitive fund, a fund that 
is only established after some study of the discipline. Ard lltis is something 
lllat few of us ha veover a wide range of disciplines. Yet 10 find considerable 
resemblance in Ille images offered to us by artists in paintings and mixed 
media projects by doing no more Ulan p0inting to a few spectrograms and 
X-ray diffraction patterns says something about the p0ssibili1y of finding 
further isomorphisms. The investigation of lltings large (for example, 
galaxies) and small (for example, particles) provides us wiU1 innumerable 
instances of similarity and, thus. familiarity. It i s just a matter of having a 
cognitive fund lllat is tuned 10 such imagery.31 
Of course, some philosophers might sugge.~1 caution at lltis point. One 
such philosopher is Deardsley, who distinguishes between suggestive and 
non-suggestive non-representational painting. Beardsley appears to be 
critical of any attempt to expand U1e scope of representational an, not simply 
because he seems unwilling to reduce the number of notable and distinctive 
characteristics that a design must have in common with an obj ect in nature 
for the design 10 depict something, and hence, to represent somellting. but 
because he thin.ks Uiat not having enough of these characteristics still allows 
a design to at least suggest an object in the world willlout representing it. 32 
So ii is not an all or none proposition for him. Abstract expresslon1St 
paintings, for instance, have "areas U1a1 suggest, however vaguely, such 
lltings as insects, femalcbodies, crees, machinery, and rocks, though willlout 
representing them, and U1e suggestions of different areas cohere to some 
degree. "33 Tilis is suggestive non-representational art, exemplified by such 
works as Willem de Kooning's Woman and Bicycle (1952-53) and Woman 
as a llmdscape (1953-55). However. there are non-suggestive non-
representational designs: "They are the designs that are mostly limited to 
straight lines, a few primary colors. and quite regular and simple shapes 
willlout deptll- those that arc frequently cal led 'geometrical ' ... . "J< 
Beardsley would, no doubt. find Newman's Vir HeroicusSublimis to be an 
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exemplar of such a design, because it has an insufficient number of notable 
and distinctive characteristics in common with anything, including Ille 
spectrogram of sunlight, for it to be either representational or suggestive. 
Willi regard 10 Ille Janer, the insufficient number of characteristics would 
make it more of a case of ''reading something into the design." As Beardsley 
writes about such art, 
I suppose one could say lha1asquareon Ille balhroom noorsuggestsa box, 
a cabin, or a barn. but U1is would be an odd and unnecessary way of 
speaking. lf you cannot connect these suggestions with suggestions from 
olher shapes in the pauem, it would be more like reading something into 
Ille design lhan seeing what is !here." 
My response 10 his discussion is twofold. First, Beardsley does not 
make clear how many and what kind of characteristics a design must have 
in common with a particular object for it to represent or suggest. Where do 
we draw the line between representational and non-representational paint-
ings? Furthermore. ctoes Ulis not have something to do with the son of 
cognitive fund that a person i s working from? It is unlikely that a viewer will 
see what appears 10 bea barn when he or she looks at Vir fleroicus S11blimis, 
though not someUling U1a1 can be rejected out of hand. Dut for Ille viewer 
to say lllat ii resembles Ille red band of !he dark-line spectrogram of sunlight 
becomes more likely if he or she is fam iliar with absorption spectrosc.opy. 
And second. even if we accept Beardsley's distinction. representation 
and suggestion still have something in common, that is, they both involve 
familiar characteristics bet ween the design and an object in Ille world. And 
this is imp0nant, for wheU1cr an individual undergoes !he experience of 
aesthetic alienation i s dependent upon having an objcctivist prejudice as 
well as a cognitive fund U1at does not allow U1e viewer to be familiar with 
the sons of objects that may be referred to by the painting. 
A note shOuld be Interjected here concerning the conc.Iilions of aesU1etic 
alienation, for what has been discussed so far ntight suggest that the only 
way in which a viewer with an objcctivist prejudice can become less 
vulnerable to aesthetic alienation is by enhancing his or her cognitive fund 
through learning about Ille latest scientific discoveries and iechnological 
innovations. But to say tllis would be to unduly restrict tJ1e scope of 
cognitive enhancement and to associate it wiU1 j ust one condition, i.e., the 
familiarity condition. l11e problem wiU1 this is that cognitive enhancement 
can also occur by learning about an-its technical aspects. its history, and 
its art.ists-which could replace the ohjectivi st prejudice with an approach 
lllat is Jess encumbered by a search for the familiar. Thus, learning about art 
may have Ille beneficial effect of making the viewer less likely to experience 
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alienation. But for the great mass of people who do not partake in this son 
of cognitive enhancement, it will be tl1tough the assimilation of knowledge 
about science and technology that will underlie their increasing resistance 
to aesthetic alienation. 
Following Feibleman's line of argument. then, we find the images of 
science and technology in the abstractions of today's an, allowing us to 
become attached to the world without the experience of aesthetic alienation. 
It is by stressing the dyad of resemblance-representation that we find more 
and more that is familiar in what we see when we took at abstract paintings. 
With an enriched conceptual fund, an objectivist viewer may not only say 
"I see an expanse of red," but he or she may say "That looks like a 
spectrogram." It is this enrichment. perhaps more Ulan anything else. which 
helps to solidify our attad1ment to abstract works of art. 
Conclusion 
To whatever degree of abstraction a painting may attaln. the worldliness 
of that painting is measured by the degree to which its appreciators undergo 
tlle experience of alienation. Toe more a person's cognitive fund is enriched 
by tile assimilation of modern scientific discoveries and technolog1cal 
innovations, the less likely heor she will experience aesthetic alienation. If 
our cognitive funds are truly fashioned in this way, and if attenation is in 
inverse proportion to our familiarity wiU1 the images that wt: see when we 
look at a painting, then the appropriation of science and technology into our 
lives will lead 10 a reduction in aesU1etic alienation.36 
Tilis implication leads me to the following final thought. What has been 
discussed so far is twcnticth·ccntury Western art and soc iety. But what 
about ar1 forms of other societies? 11 is no1 too terribly difficull to imagine 
a people who are totally immerse~ in, for example. traditional Amazonian 
an rather Ulan the cosmopolitan an of Brazil. And to make it more 
interesting, let us suppose U1at the traditional art is representational. Would 
anyone in such a traditional society experience aesthetic alienalio_n? Woul~ 
there be persons estranged from at least a portion of the cultural life of their 
community? Probably. In llliscase. however, the distinguishing character-
istic between those who are alienated and those who are not would be closely 
associated wiU1 the age of Uie individual insofar as U1e younger members of 
the community would nol have sufficiently appropriated the knowledge of 
his or her forefathers through oral histories. Each of their cognitive funds 
would not be as developed as U1ose of the elders oflhecommunity. To think, 
then. Uiat a day will come when aesthetic alienation will be an experience 
oflhe past is to dwell upon the fantastic. There will always be those whO feel 
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separated from some aesU1etic aspect of their culture so long as there are 
differences in the cognitive funds of' the members of the community. 
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